FACTS:
PASEI engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement," challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1 of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS,". The measure is assailed for "discrimination against males or females;" that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills;" and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character.
On May 25, 1988,
the Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondents Secretary of Labor and
Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, filed a
Comment informing the Court that on March 8, 1988, the respondent Labor
Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar,
Canada, Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway, Austria, and Switzerland. In
submitting the validity of the challenged "guidelines," the Solicitor
General invokes the police power of the Philippine State.
ISSUE:
DO No. 1 is valid under the Constitution.
RULING:
YES. Petition must be dismissed. It is admitted that Department Order No. 1 is in the nature of a police power measure.
The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good.
"Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits."
It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the Charter. Along with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it to perform the most vital functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the expression has been credited, refers to it succinctly as the plenary power of the State "to govern its citizens."
"The police power of the State ... is a power coextensive with self- protection, and it is not inaptly termed the "law of overwhelming necessity." It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society."
It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. According to Fernando, it is "rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to ensure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare." Significantly, the Bill of Rights itself does not purport to be an absolute guaranty of individual rights and liberties "Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one's will." It is subject to the far more overriding demands and requirements of the greater number.
Police power is not without its own limitations. For all its awesome consequences, it may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise, and in that event, it defeats the purpose for which it is exercised, that is, to advance the public good. Thus, when the power is used to further private interests at the expense of the citizenry, there is a clear misuse of the power
As a general rule, official acts enjoy a presumed validity. In the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, the presumption logically stands.
The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class.
·
The classification made-the preference for female
workers — rests on substantial distinctions.
Ø Exploitative working conditions for female labor force abroad. Isolated instances that men abroad have been afflicted with identical predicament
·
Such a classification is germane to the purpose
behind the measure.
Ø It is the avowed objective of Department Order No. 1 to "enhance the protection for Filipino female overseas workers" this Court has no quarrel that in the midst of the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered abroad, a ban on deployment will be for their own good and welfare.
·
The Order does not narrowly apply to existing
conditions.
Ø It is intended to apply indefinitely so long as those conditions exist. This is clear from the Order itself
·
The impugned guidelines to be applicable to all
female domestic overseas workers.
Ø It does not apply to
"all Filipina workers" is not an argument for unconstitutionality. Had
the ban been given universal applicability, then it would have been
unreasonable and arbitrary.
Ø What the Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select person or group of persons within an existing class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or resulting in an unfair advantage to another person or group of persons.
The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right (IT IS NOT ABSOLUTE). The right to travel is subject, among other things, to the requirements of "public safety," "as may be provided by law." Department Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its basic policy to "afford protection to labor," pursuant to the respondent Department of Labor's rule-making authority vested in it by the Labor Code.
It is true that police power is the domain of the legislature, but it does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated. As we have mentioned, the Labor Code itself vests the Department of Labor and Employment with rulemaking powers in the enforcement whereof.
"Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of employment alone. What concerns the Constitution more paramountly is that such an employment be above all, decent, just, and humane. The Government is duty-bound to insure that our toiling expatriates have adequate protection, personally and economically, while away from home, and as part of its duty, it has precisely ordered an indefinite ban on deployment.
The Government has not indiscriminately made use of its authority. It is not contested that it has in fact removed the prohibition with respect to certain countries.
Freedom of contract and enterprise, like all other freedoms, is not free from restrictions, more so in this jurisdiction, where laissez faire has never been fully accepted as a controlling economic way of life.
The concern of the Government, however, is
not necessarily to maintain profits of business firms. The interest of the
State is to provide a decent living to its citizens.